The Data-Mining-as-a-Service (DMaS) paradigm is becoming the focus of research, as it allows the data owner (client) who lacks expertise and/or computational resources to outsource their data and mining needs to a third-party service provider (server). Outsourcing, however, raises some issues about result integrity: how could the client verify the mining results returned by the server are both sound and complete? In this paper, we focus on outlier mining, an important mining task. Previous verification techniques use an authenticated data structure (ADS) for correctness authentication, which may incur much space and communication cost. In this paper, we propose a novel solution that returns a probabilistic result integrity guarantee with much cheaper verification cost. The key idea is to insert a set of artificial records (ARs) into the dataset, from which it constructs a set of artificial outliers (AOs) and artificial non-outliers (ANOs). The AOs and ANOs are used by the client to detect any incomplete and/or incorrect mining results with a probabilistic guarantee. The main challenge that we address is how to construct ARs so that they do not change the (non-)outlierness of original records, while guaranteeing that the client can identify ANOs and AOs without executing mining. Furthermore, we build a strategic game and show that a Nash equilibrium exists only when the server returns correct outliers. Our implementation and experiments demonstrate that our verification solution is efficient and lightweight.
INTRODUCTION
T HE ability to generate and collect massive amounts of data has grown exponentially in the past years. This rises new challenges in data analytics to extract valuable insights. Fortunately, the advent in networking technologies make it possible to transmit large volume of data through the Internet. It allows data owners, especially those who have large volume of data but limited budget for data analysis, to outsource their data and data mining needs to a third-party service provider. This is referred as the Data-Mining-as-a-Service (DMaS) model [42] , [49] , which provides a cost-effective computing infrastructure for those users who have limited resources for sophisticate data analytics. The model allows the data owner to leverage hardware and software solutions provided by DMaS providers, without developing their own.
In this paper, we focus on outlier mining, which is to find data objects that do not comply with the general patterns of the majority. Outlier detection plays a critical role in many real-world applications such as computer system intrusion detection, credit card fraud detection and industrial damage detection. The problem of outlier detection has been widely studied in the data mining community [2] , [6] , [21] , [43] . Previous work [2] , [21] show that outlier detection is of high computational complexity; it can be prohibitive if the data has high dimensionality. Although the researchers have proposed several optimization approaches [4] , [43] to improve the efficiency of outlier detection, it is difficult for the data owner who lacks the expertise to exploit these techniques. Outsourcing outlier mining to a DMaS service provider becomes a natural solution.
Although the DMaS paradigm is beneficial for the data owner (client) with limited capabilities to perform sophisticated analysis on their large volume of data, it brings several security challenges. One major concern is the integrity of the mining results returned by the service provider (server). Given the fact that the server is potentially untrusted, it is necessary for the client to authenticate if the outliers returned by the server are correct. There are many reasons for the server to return wrong results. For example, the server may return wrong mining results accidentally due to software bugs; it may keep part of the mining results to itself intentionally so that it can sell the retained results to the competitors of the client for profit. There also exists a strong financial incentive for the server to reduce the computational cost. For example, the server may execute the outlier mining on a portion of the outsourced dataset, and charge the client for mining of the whole dataset. The primary challenge in authenticating the outsourced outlier mining arises from the weak computational resources at the client side.
Following [3] , we consider three types of the servers that return incorrect mining results: (1) the Class I server that is not aware of the authentication process by the client; (2) the Class II server that is aware of the fact that the client may perform authentication on mining result, but does not have details of the authentication process; and (3) the Class III server that knows the details of the authentication process and tries to avoid being caught by verification. The goal of our verification method is to check if the outliers returned by any of these three types of servers are both sound and complete. By soundness, we mean that each returned tuple is a true outlier. By completeness, we mean that all true outliers must be returned by the server.
In consistence with the other work [11] , [50] , we do not require a trusted third-party that performs the authentication for the client. A seemly straightforward solution is that for each returned record, the client checks if it is indeed an outlier against the original dataset. Though simple, this approach requires computations of OðnkÞ complexity, where n is the size of the dataset and k is the number of outliers returned by the server. Due to the large volume of data, this naive approach may not be feasible, especially if the client uses a resource-constrained device (e.g., a smart phone) that has weak computational power for authentication. Moreover, this solution cannot verify the completeness of the outliers.
In theory, the techniques that verify general-purpose computation [5] , [19] can be applied to authenticate any outsourced computation task. These verification techniques require a preprocessing phase in which the client generates auxiliary information of the outsourced computation. Then the server constructs interactive proofs or probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) to demonstrate the correctness of the returned result. Unfortunately, this body of theory is considered to be impractical, due to the complexity of the preprocessing step and the expensive cost of using general-purpose cryptographic proofs for data mining problems. A large body of the existing authentication techniques use an authenticated data structure (ADS) (e.g., [24] , [52] ). The key idea is that the client constructs an ADS from her dataset, and sends both the dataset and ADS to the server. During query processing, the server traverses the ADS and constructs a verification object (VO) that proves the correctness of the results. The VO is sent back to the client together with the query results for verification. Though effective, ADS-based authentication may incur significant space and communication cost.
We propose an efficient probabilistic authentication framework for outsourced outlier mining. The architecture of our approach is illustrated in Fig. 1 . There are two entities, the data owner (client) and the service provider (server). To verify the correctness of the outliers returned by the server, the client is equipped with an auditor component which can be viewed as a "black box" software. In particular, the auditor component consists of two modules, namely the injector module and the tester module. The injector module, which can be executed on a computer desktop, generates a set of artificial records (ARs) offline. The ARs are used to construct the artificial outliers (AOs) and artificial non-outliers (ANOs). The ARs are inserted into the original database and sent to the server. Meanwhile, the injector module produces a small piece of auxiliary information (including a hash function, three constants, and the number of AOs and ANOs). The auxiliary information is maintained at the tester side for verification purpose. After outsourcing the dataset and the outlier detection task, the client receives and verifies the outliers returned by the server by executing the tester module. In particular, the tester module analyzes the returned outliers against the AOs and ANOs, and quantifies the probabilistic guarantee of the result correctness. We show that incorrect answers from the server can be caught with high confidence by utilizing a small number of AOs and ANOs, even for large datasets. This makes it feasible to run verification on the resource-constrained devices such as smart phones. We make the following contributions: 1) We design an efficient authentication approach that generates AOs and ANOs without any need to do outlier mining of the original dataset. One major challenge is that inserting any artificial record into the dataset may change the (non-)outlierness of the original records. We design a novel AOs/ANOs construction algorithm that does not eliminate any true outlier. We also discuss how to remove the false positive outliers (i.e., the original non-outliers that become outliers in the dataset with AOs/ANOs) introduced by AOs/ANOs and recover the true outliers efficiently. Formal analysis shows that a small number of AOs/ANOs can verify the result returned by the Class I server with high probabilistic guarantee. 2) To incentivize the Class II server to behave honestly, we design a game theoretic approach to decide the appropriate parameter values for the authentication setting, so that a rationale server should always return correct mining results to obtain the most payoff. 3) We discuss the authentication-aware cheating behaviors by the Class III server. As a countermeasure, we propose two approaches to catch the Class III server. 4) We run an extensive set of experiments on two datasets to demonstrate the efficiency and the effectiveness of our authentication approach. The experimental results show that the AO and ANO construction takes at most 1 second on the client side. Furthermore, the mining overhead at the server side is no more than 1.2 percent. An earlier and short version of this paper was published in the European Conference on Machine Learning and Principles and Practice of Knowledge Discovery in Databases (ECML/PKDD) [26] . The short version only considers the Class I server. In this paper, we extend the short version significantly with: (1) a game theoretic approach that analyzes the Class II server's behaviors and incentivizes the server to return correct mining results; and (2) the security analysis of our verification approach against the Class III server.
The paper is organized as following. Section 2 introduces the preliminaries. Section 3 presents our AR-based approach to construct AOs and ANOs to catch the Class I server. Section 4 discusses the strategic game to incentivize the Class II server to do mining and return correct results honestly. Section 5 analyzes the security against the cheating behaviors by the Class III server trying to escape from the AR-based authentication, assuming that it possesses the details of the authentication mechanism. Section 6 presents our experimental results. Section 7 discusses related work. Section 8 concludes the paper.
PRELIMINARIES

Distance-Based Outlier Mining
A variety of definitions of outliers, including distance-based outliers [21] and density-based outliers [8] , have been proposed recently. In this paper, we focus on distance-based outliers, due to the properties that it works well for datasets of any dimension, and it does not assume that the data follows a standard distribution [21] . Specifically, an object t in the dataset D is a ðp; dÞ-outlier if it is at least of distance d away from at least p proportion of all objects in D. In the rest of this paper, we use outlier and ðp; dÞ-outlier interchangeably. If an object does not satisfy the condition, we call it a non-outlier. We measure the distance between two objects based the euclidean distance. In specific, given two records tða 1 ; . . . ; a k Þ and t 0 ða 0
Outsourcing Setting
We consider the outsourcing setting that consists of two parties, the data owner (client) who possesses a dataset D and aims to find outliers in D, and the service provider (server) that provides distance-based outlier mining as the service. When the client outsources the dataset to the server, she communicates with the server regarding the parameter setting of p and d values for ðp; dÞ-outlier mining. She can either choose to re-configure the p and d parameters by herself or follow the parameter settings by the server. The server executes outlier mining according to the parameter setting. We assume the server finds exact outliers instead of approximate ones [22] , [37] .
Adversary Model
In this paper, we adopt the taxonomy of [3] of the attackers to consider three types of servers that possess different knowledge of the authentication approach.
The Class I (ordinary outsider) server that is not aware of the authentication method, but is curious to find out if there is any authentication mechanism. The Class II (intelligent outsider) server that is aware of the fact that the client may perform result correctness authentication. However, it does not have the details of the authentication approach. The Class III (knowledgeable insider) server that knows the details of the authentication approach and may try to escape the verification by returning welldesigned incorrect answer intentionally.
Authentication Goal
Let O be the set of outliers in the outsourced dataset D, and O S be the set of outliers returned by the server. We define the precision of O as P ¼ jO\O S j jO S j and the recall as R ¼ jO\O S j jOj . Intuitively, precision measures the fraction of returned outliers that are correct, while recall quantifies the fraction of correct outliers that are returned. The aim of our authentication approach is to catch any wrong answer, i.e., P < 1 or R < 1, with a high probability. Next, we formally define the authentication goal as ða; aÞ-completeness and ðb; bÞ-soundness. Definition 2.1. Given a dataset D and a verification method M, let pr p and pr r be the probabilities that M catches the server that returns the result of precision P b and recall R a respectively, where a; b 2 ½0; 1 are given thresholds. We say M can verify ða; aÞ-completeness if pr r ! a, and can verify ðb; bÞ-soundness if pr p ! b, where a; b 2 ½0; 1 are also given threshold values.
If the client catches the server's cheating behavior, then the client is 100 percent sure that O S is either unsound or incomplete. Otherwise, the client believes that O S satisfies that: (1) R > a with probability a; and (2) P > b with probability b.
Game Theory
A strategic game is a model of interacting decision-makers. The game involves a set of players. Each player has a set of possible actions. For each player, the preferences/payoffs over the set of action profiles are pre-defined. Each player chooses his/her action once and for all, and the players choose their actions "simultaneously" without any player being informed. A Nash Equilibrium is an action profile A Ã with the property that no player can get more payoff by choosing an action different from her action in A Ã , given that every other player adheres to A Ã [33] . Intuitively, a Nash Equilibrium corresponds to a steady state. If, whenever the game is played, the action profile is the same as the Nash Equilibrium A Ã , then no player has a reason to choose any action different from his/her component of A Ã .
AR-BASED APPROACH TO CATCH CLASS I SERVER
The key idea of our authentication framework is that the client constructs a set of artificial records (ARs) before outsourcing. Let DD be the artificial records. Given the original dataset D, each record in DD is either an artificial outlier (AO) or an artificial non-outlier (ANO). The client combines D with DD to get D þ and sends D þ to the server. If the server conducts the outlier mining faithfully, it should return all AOs but no ANO.
In this section, we focus on the Class I server that is not aware of the authentication procedure and thus cannot distinguish ARs from the original records. Therefore, the client is able to obtain a probabilistic guarantee of the soundness and completeness of the returned outliers by comparing them with the AOs and ANOs. Next, we first discuss how to construct ANOs and AOs in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. After that, we prove that the AR-based approach preserves the (non) outliers in the original dataset in Section 3.3. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 discuss the auxiliary data and the authentication procedures at the client side.
Construction of Artificial Non-Outliers (ANOs)
Before we introduce the ANO construction procedures, we define close records and distant records first. Intuitively, T L ðt; dÞ is the set of records in D whose distance to t is smaller than d, while T U ðt; dÞ stores the set of records that are at least d distance away from t. Next, we define the farthest close neighbor and closest distant neighbor respective.
Definition 3.2. Given a dataset D, a record t and a distance threshold d, a record t 0 2 T L ðt; dÞ is the farthest close neighbor of record t, if the distance between t and t 0 is the largest among all records in T L ðt; dÞ. Similarly, a record t 0 2 T U ðt; dÞ is the closest distant neighbor of record t, if the distance between t and t 0 is the smallest among all records in T U ðt; dÞ. Definition 3.3. Given the dataset D of r dimensions, a record t 2 D and the distance threshold d, let t a 2 D be the farthest close neighbor of t, and t b 2 D be the closest distant neighbor of t. Let d a ¼ distðt; t a Þ, and d b ¼ distðt; t b Þ. Let Q be an r-sphere with t as the centroid, and minð dÀda 2 ; d b Àd 2 Þ as the radius, where d is the distance parameter of ðp; dÞ-outlier mining. Then we say any record t 0 2 D is a close record to t if it falls in Q.
Next, we show that the close records of t have the same distance property as t.
Lemma 3.1. Given a record t and a close record t c of t, for any
Proof. Since t a is the farthest close neighbor of t, for any t 0 s.t.
Note that Lemma 3.1 holds no matter t 0 is an outlier or non-outlier in the dataset D. Based on Lemma 3.1, we use Theorem 3.1 to prove that any record close to record t always has the same non-outlierness as t. Proof. Let t c be a close record of a true record t in D. It is straightforward from Lemma 3.1 that t c and t have the same number of records whose distance is greater than
Theorem 3.1 provides us the guidance to construct ANOs. In particular, we first pick a seed record t seed that is a non-outlier record in the original dataset D. Then we construct a set of artificial records as the close records of t seed , and take these artificial records as ANOs. Fig. 2a illustrates the construction procedure of ANO in a 2-dimensional dataset.
To pick t seed , we repeatedly pick a record from D randomly, and check its non-outlierness, until a non-outlier record is selected. The probability that t seed will be picked at the xth trial is
where f to is is the number of outliers, and n is the number of records in D respectively. It is straightforward that 1 x n À f to . We define f ¼ f to n . Then gðxÞ ¼ ð1 À fÞf xÀ1 , where 1 x n À nf. The expected value of x equals to
As usually the outliers are only a small portion of the whole dataset, f is a small number (e.g., f ¼ 0:05% [35] ). Therefore, EðxÞ % 1. In other words, it is highly likely that t seed can be picked by the first random trial. After t seed is identified, we can construct ANOs by constructing the r-sphere Q (defined in Definition 3.3) of t seed , and picking any record in Q as a ANO. The computation of t seed needs to traverse D once. It requires a scan of the dataset D to identify t seed , and takes another round to determine the radius of the r-sphere Q (defined in Definition 3.3). Therefore, we can construct ANOs by two passes of D.
Construction of Artificial Outliers (AO)
A seemly straightforward way to construct AOs is similar to the construction of ANOs: we first find a seed outlier from the dataset D and then construct artificial records that are close to the seed as AOs. However, this approach may be prohibitively expensive, since the outliers are rare and finding an outlier may require mining of the original dataset. Our goal is to construct AOs without mining the original dataset to find any outlier. In the following, we discuss the details of how to construct AOs efficiently.
Our construction procedure relies on the definition of distant records.
Definition 3.4. Given a r-dimension dataset D and a set of records S D, we say a record t = 2 S is a distant record of S if for each record t 0 2 S, distðt; t 0 Þ > d, where d is the parameter setting of ðp; dÞ-outlier mining.
We have the following lemma to show a important property of distant records. 
The correctness of Lemma 3.3 is straightforward. Next, we use Theorem 3.2 to show that ðp; dÞ-outliers can be generated from the distant records. The correctness of Theorem 3.2 is straightforward. For any distant record t, there must exist a set of records S D, whose size is greater than p fraction of the size of D, such that the distance between t and any record t 0 2 S must be greater than d. Therefore, t must be a ðp; dÞ-outlier. Based on Theorem 3.2, we design the AO construction procedure as follows.
First, the client picks a sample S of size dpjDje records randomly from D. Second, the client treats S as an r-dimension hypercube R. The range ½min i ; max i represents the edge at the ith dimension of R. Then the client randomly picks k r dimensions (possibly k ¼ 1) of R. Last, the client expands the picked k dimensions of R by d ffiffi k p (i.e., change the minimum and maximum value of the ith attribute to be min i À d ffiffi k p and max i þ d ffiffi k p ). Let the expanded hypercube be R 0 . Then any record t ao that is created outside of R 0 must be a ðp; dÞ-outlier of D. Fig. 2b illustrates the construction procedure in a 2-dimensional dataset. How to decide f ao will be discussed in Section 3.5.1. The complexity of AO construction is OðnÞ, where n is the size of D.
Preservation of (Non)Outlierness
One issue of inserting ARs into D is that ðp; dÞ-outliers in the original dataset D may not be ðp; dÞ-outliers in D þ ¼ D [ DD anymore, as inserting records into D may change the (non) outlierness of some original records in D. This may ruin the authentication method as even the server executes the outlier mining and returns the result faithfully, it will be wrongly caught by the AR-based verification approach. Therefore, the client must make sure that all ðp; dÞ-outliers in D are also outliers in D þ . In this section, we discuss the followings:
How to ensure that the true ðp; dÞ-outliers in D are still recognized as outliers in D þ ; and How to eliminate the false positive outliers (i.e., the records that are not ðp; dÞ-outliers in D but become outliers in D þ ). Preservation of True AOs. First, we show how to make sure that the ðp; dÞ-outliers in D are still outliers in D þ by only using a different p value in ðp; dÞ-outlier mining. 
Proof. For a true record t 2 D, let x and y be the number of original and artificial records (including both AOs and ANOs) whose distance to t is greater than d in D þ . Now we prove that it must be true that xþy jD þ j ! p 1 ¼ pjDj jD þ j . This can be proven by the following. Since record t is a ðp; dÞ-outlier in D, it must be true that x ! pjDj. This naturally leads to that xþy jD þ j ! pjDj
Following Theorem 3.3, instead of requesting for ðp; dÞ-outliers in the outsourced dataset D þ , the client asks for ðp 1 ; dÞ-outliers in D þ , where p 1 is defined in Formula (1). All ðp; dÞ-outliers in D must appear in the answer if the server is honest. Note that all AOs must be appear in ðp 1 ; dÞ-outliers of D þ too.
Elimination of False Positive Outliers. It is not necessary that all ðp 1 ; dÞ-outliers in D þ must be ðp; dÞ-outliers in D. In the words, by asking for ðp 1 ; dÞ-outliers on D þ , the server may return some false positive outliers. To eliminate those false positives, we have: Theorem 3.4. Given a dataset D, let DD be the set of ARs that are used to construct AOs and ANOs. Then any ðp 2 ; dÞ-outlier
Proof. For a record t 2 D þ , let x and y be the number of original and artificial records (including both AOs and ANOs) whose distance to t is greater than d in D þ . Since the x true records must exist in D, we aim to prove that
x jDj ! p. This can be proven as follows. Since t is a ðp 2 ; dÞ-outlier in D þ , it must be true that xþy jD þ j ! p 2 . In other words, x þ y ! pjDj þ jDDj. Since y jDDj, it must be true that x ! pjDj. Therefore, the theorem holds. t u
Following Theorem 3.4, all the constructed ANOs must be ðp 2 ; dÞ-non-outliers in D þ . Fig. 3 illustrates the relationship among ðp 1 ; dÞ-and ðp 2 ; dÞ-outliers (p 1 and p 2 are defined by Equations (1) and (2) respectively) in D þ and ðp; dÞ-outliers in D. For a given record t 2 D, let r be the fraction of records in D þ ¼ D [ DD whose distance to t is greater than d, where d is the parameter for ðp; dÞ-outlier mining. Then t must fall into one of the following three categories:
dÞ-outlier or a ðp; dÞ-non-outlier in D, otherwise. Based on both Theorems 3.3 and 3.4, the outsourcing and the authentication procedures are designed as the following. The client constructs D þ ¼ D [ DD and outsources D þ to the server. She sends two mining requests to the server for ðp 1 ; dÞ-outliers and ðp 2 ; dÞ-outliers, where p 1 ¼ pjDj jD þ j , and p 2 ¼ pjDjþDD jD þ j . Let O 1 and O 2 be the set of outliers received from the two requests separately. It is worth noting that O 2 O 1 . Therefore, the client can get both ðp 1 ; dÞ-outliers and ðp 2 ; dÞ-outliers by outsourcing the task only once.
Auxiliary Data for Authentication
Auxiliary Data Sent to the Server. Before the client sends out her dataset, she generates two digests, namely dig a and dig b , for each record t 2 D þ with a cryptographic hash function. Let s be the secret key of the client, and H denote the signing function of a message authentication code (MAC), e.g., the Hash-based message authentication code (HMAC). Given a record tða 1 ; . . . ; a r Þ, we have dig a ¼ Hðs; tÞ, and
where c 1 , c 2 and c 3 are three unique constant values kept secret at the client side.
Intuitively, dig a helps the client to check if the server has modified any record in D þ , while dig b can be used to distinguish the original records from the AOs and ANOs.
After completing the computation of digests, the client sends D þ to the server. Each record is associated with its two digests dig a and dig b . When the server returns any outlier to the client, it is required to return the two digests too.
Auxiliary Data Maintained at the Client Side. The client keeps the private key s locally, and maintains the number of AOs and ANOs, and the three constants c 1 , c 2 , and c 3 that are used to construct the digests. It is straightforward that the space overhead of these auxiliary information is negligible. For each outlier record t returned by the server, the client computes its digest dig a , and the three signatures
by using the three constants c 1 , c 2 , and c 3 that it has stored locally. Then by comparing the digests
against the dig b that is attached to t, the client can distinguish whether t is a original record in D, an AO or an ANO.
Authentication and Post-Processing at Client Side
After receiving O 1 and O 2 from the server, the client checks the integrity and post-processes the result as the following.
Authentication at Client Side
The client runs the 2-phase verification procedure to check the soundness and completeness of the result. Phase-1. For each record t 2 O 1 or t 2 O 2 , the client recomputes the digest dig a by applying the stored hash function H (Section 3.4) on t. If the computed digest does match the one that is associated with t, the client concludes that the server has returned records that do not exist in the outsourced database, and thus fails to pass the verification.
Phase-2. If the server passes the phase-1 verification, the client further computes three digests:
by using the three constants c 1 , c 2 and c 3 that the client stores locally. By comparing these digests with the digest dig b associated with t, the client can identify whether the returned tuple is a true record, an AO, or an ANO. Then the client verifies the completeness and soundness respectively.
Completeness Authentication. To verify whether the server has returned all true outliers, the client checks whether every AO is included in O 1 . If not, the client catches the incomplete outlier answer with 100 percent; otherwise, the client trusts that the the recall R of the result is at least a with probability pr r ¼ 1 À a fao , where f ao is the number of artificial outliers. This is because for each AO in D þ , the probability that the server includes it in O 1 is a. The probability that the server avoids being caught by the client, i.e., the probability that the server returns all AOs in O 1 , is a fao . Therefore, to satisfy ða; aÞ-completeness (i.e., pr r ! a), it is required that
Soundness Authentication. For the soundness authentication, the client checks whether if any ANO appears in O 2 . If it does, the client catches the incorrect answer with 100 percent; otherwise, the client believes that the precision P of the result returned by the server is at least b with probability pr p ¼ 1 À b fano , where f ano is the number of artificial nonoutliers. Similar to the reasoning in the completeness authentication, the probability that the server does not return any ANO in O 2 is b fano . Thus to meet the ðb; bÞ-soundness (i.e., pr p ! b) requirement, f ano must satisfy that
Equations (3) and (4) show that f ao and f ano (the number of AOs and ANOs) are independent of the size of D. Therefore, our authentication framework would be especially efficient for large datasets. Furthermore, it does not need large number of AOs and ANOs to provide high soundness and completeness guarantee. For instance, when a ¼ 0:99 (i.e., the server misses 1 percent of the outliers) and a ¼ 0:99 (i.e., the probability to catch such answer is at least 0.99), it only needs 459 AOs to verify ð0:99; 0:99Þ-completeness. Overhead Analysis. The complexity of soundness and completeness authentication is Oðf ao þ f ano Þ. Our empirical study shows that f ao and f ano are relatively small even for Fig. 3 . ðp 1 ; dÞ-outliers and ðp 2 ; dÞ-outliers in D þ versus ðp; dÞ-outlier in D;
large datasets (Section 6). This enables the client to accomplish authentication on resource-constrained devices (e.g., smart phones). 2 are the set of original ðp; dÞ-outliers in D. As will shown in the Experiment section (Section 6), the records in O 1 n O 2 take a negligible portion of D (less than 0.2 percent). Therefore, the complexity of outlier recovery at the client side is OðjDjÞ.
Recovery of
A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH TO INCENTIVIZE CLASS II SERVER
While our AR-based authentication approach enables the client to catch the Class I server with high probability, a Class II server that is aware of the probabilistic authentication strategy may still make the most outcome by performing cheaper outlier mining computations and returning incorrect results.
In this section, we aim at incentivizing the Class II server not to cheat on the outlier mining computations. A possible solution is to build a strategic game [48] between the client and server, in which a Nash equilibrium [36] exists only when the server's action is to return correct mining results. Based on the theory of rational choice, due to the Nash Equilibrium, a rational server will always play the game honestly, if he can not gain more payoff by switching to cheating. We emphasize that even though we focus on the outsourced outlier mining, our incentive game model can be applied to other types of outsourced computations. There are two players, i.e., the server and the client, in this game. Each player has the following actions.
Client
-Verify: The client uses the AR-based approach to authenticate the returned outlier mining results. -Trust-without-verification: The client simply accepts the results returned by the server. With a certain level of belief, the client trusts the result to be correct. The belief can be obtained based on the server's reputation.
If the client accepts the server's mining results (either after verification or without verification), the client pays the server for its mining efforts. The payment is considered as the server's payoff.
Server -Cheat: The server returns wrong outliers to the client. If the cheating behavior is caught by the client, the server receives no payment from the client. Instead, it pays the penalty for the cheating. -Honest play: The server executes mining faithfully and returns the correct outliers to the client. For the following discussions, we use the notations defined in Table 1 .
Next, we present the payoff matrix (Table 2) for the client and server with various actions. We assume c v , c m , and p c are in the monetary format. We also assume that the client's benefit gained from correct outlier mining result (i.e., u m ) can be measured in the same format as c v , c m , and p c . Regarding the results that were considered as correct with probability h (, resp.), the client's benefit gained from the result is measured as hu m (u m , resp.). We use ð; Þ to denote the payoffs, where the left (right, resp.) value is the client's (server's resp.) total payoff by the specific actions. We explain the details of various payoffs as below.
(Verify, Not Cheat): When the server does not cheat, there is no need that the client catches the server (with N=A in the corresponding Catch row). Thus the client trusts the returned outlier results with confidence and pays the full price for the server's mining efforts. The client's payoff is u m À c v À p m , and the server's payoff is p m À c m . (Verify, Cheat): Due to the probabilistic property of the AR-based authentication approach, the client may not catch the server's cheating behaviors. Assume that the server returns s (0 < s < 1) fraction of the outliers, the client can still obtain su m utility, while the server's mining cost is sc m . If the client catches the server (i.e., for the Catch case), the server needs to pay the penalty to the client. So the client's payoff is su m þ p c À c v , and the server's payoff is Àsc m À p c . If the client does not detect the cheating behavior (i.e., for the Not Catch case), the client still needs to pay the server for the mining. So the client's payoff is su m À c v À p m , and the server's payoff is p m À sc m . (Not Verify, Not Cheat): The client trusts the result correctness with probability h. Thus the client's payoff is hu m À p m , and the server's is p m À c m . Client's benefit gained from correct outlier mining result 2 ½0; 1 Probability of catching server by AR-based authentication h 2 ½0; 1 Result correctness belief for trust-without-verification 2 ½0; 1 Result correctness belief for pass of verification s 2 ½0; 1 Fraction of correct outliers that are returned by the server (Not Verify, Cheat): As the client does not verify the result, the server receives the payment from the client, but the client does not benefit from the mining result. Thus, the client's payoff is su m À p m , and the server's is p m À sc m . Ideally, we want the action profile (*, Not Cheat) to be the steady state (Nash Equilibrium), where Ã stands for any action for the client. This is because any Nash Equilibrium (*, Not Cheat) incentivizes the server to discover the outliers honestly. However, it is impossible to reach an equilibrium for the (Not Verify, Not Cheat) case, as the server can easily get more payoff by switching to Cheat. Thus, we can only get the desired equilibrium from (Verify, Not Cheat). According to the definition of Nash Equilibrium, an action profile is an equilibrium only if any player cannot gain more payoff by changing the action. Thus we require that P Server ðVerify;NotCheatÞ ! P Server ðVerify;CheatÞ ;
and P Client ðVerify;NotCheatÞ ! P Client ðNotVerify;NotCheatÞ :
Based on the payoffs in Table 2 , by doing the integral over s, we have 
and P Client ðNotVerify;NotCheatÞ ¼ hu m À p m :
The first part in Equation (7) measures the server's expected payoff when s < and its cheating is not detected by the client (the catching probability is ). The second part evaluates the server's payoff when getting detected in cheating (probability is 1 À ). Whereas the last part considers that the returned result contains more than fraction of correct result and is not detected by the ARbased appraoch. While P Server ðVerify;NotCheatÞ ¼ p m À c m ;
and P Client ðVerify;NotCheatÞ ¼ p m À c v À c m :
According to the requirement, the action profile ðVerify; NotCheatÞ is a Nash Equilibrium if
and
By combining Equations (11) and (12), we can get the required value of as
According to our AR-based verification approach, corresponds to a and b in the ða; aÞ-completeness and ðb; bÞ-correctness model (Definition 2.1), while confirms to a and b in the same model. Therefore, in order to incentivize the Class II server to behave honestly, when constructing the AOs and ANOs, the client should make sure that
SECURITY ANALYSIS AGAINST CLASS III SERVER
In this section, we focus on the Class III server that possesses the details of our AR-based authentication approach. We first discuss the security weakness of the AR-based approach. Then we present two robust verification approaches to catch the Class III server.
Weakness of AR-Based Authentication
We consider the authentication-aware cheating behaviors by the server: When the server is aware of the details of the authentication mechanism, it can identify (at least the candidates of) AOs and ANOs. Even though the server cheats in the outlier mining, it can avoid getting detected by returning all AOs and excluding all ANOs from the returned result. Unfortunately, our AR-based approach cannot catch the authentication-aware cheating. When the server knows the details about how ARs are constructed, it is able to identify them from D þ . In particular, it can find all AOs by two passes of D þ . Because the p value of the ðp; dÞ-outlierness is always very close to 1 in practice, the sample S used to construct AOs (Section 3) includes almost all records in D. Therefore, the constructed AOs will be the skyline points of D. Based on this, the server takes the records that have the maximum/ minimum values of any attribute as AOs. On the other hand, due to the fact that all ANOs must be the close records (Definition 3.3) to a non-outlier record, the server can identify them by searching for non-outlier records that are close to at least one non-outlier. This requires the server to find all non-outliers, whose complexity is at least as high as the cost of mining all outliers. Though expensive, after finding the AOs and ANOs, the server is able to escape from the soundness and completeness authentication.
Catching Class III Server
Sampling-Based Probabilistic Approach. To catch the authentication-aware cheating, the client can randomly pick records from the original dataset as a sample, and verify the outlierness of the sample. To check the soundness and completeness of the result returned by the server, the client checks the outlierness of the samples against the result. Intuitively, a large sample is necessary in order to obtain a high soundness/completeness guarantee. This may not be affordable by the client with limited computational power. We conjecture that the complexity of catching the authentication-aware cheating is as expensive as outlier mining itself, especially if the client requires a high result correctness probability.
Replication-Based Approach. The client can assign the outlier mining task to two servers, and verify the correctness by crosschecking the results from the two servers. To forbid collusion where the two servers return the same incorrect results, the client can create distrust between the servers by incentivizing them to betray their partner in the collusion coalition [16] . In specific, the client first takes deposit from both servers as the security for the delivery of correct answer. If any server is detected to return incorrect results, it loses the security deposit. Moreover, if one server is honest while the other is cheating, the cheating party's deposit will be taken by the honest one. Theoretical game theory analysis [16] shows that by setting appropriate deposit amounts, both rational servers will choose not to cheat to receive the maximum payoff. In this way, it is guaranteed that the Class III server returns correct outlier mining results.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We conducted an extensive set of experiments to evaluate both the robustness and performance of our AR-based authentication approach. In particular, we measured: (1) the soundness and completeness guarantee; (2) the verification overhead at the client side, which includes a) the construction time of AOs and ANOs, b) the verification time to based on AOs and ANOs, and c) the time of examining the outlierness of records to eliminate false positives; (3) the mining overhead at the server side.
Setup. In our experiment, we use two datasets, the Letterdataset 1 from UCI MLC++ Library that contains 20k records, and the KDDCUP dataset 2 that contains 100k records. The Letter dataset has 16 numerical (integer) attributes. The KDDCUP dataset contains 41 (numerical or categorical) attributes. In our experiments, we use five numerical attributes, including duration, dst_bytes, number_access_files, count, and serror_rate attributes, of the KDDCUP dataset. For Letter dataset, we used p ¼ 0:8 and d ¼ 15 that return 1 percent of the records as outliers, while for KDDCUP dataset, we used p ¼ 0:99 and d ¼ 5000 that return 2 percent of the records as outliers. All of our experiments are evaluated on a PC with a 2.4 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo CPU and 4GB RAM running Windows 7. We implemented the algorithm in Java.
ADS-Based Deterministic Authentication Approach. We implement the deterministic authentication approach that can verify the result correctness with 100 percent certainty. We design the deterministic approach by using the Merkle B-tree [24] as the authenticated data structure. By using the Merkle B-tree, the server constructs a verification object and sends the VO to the client. From the VO, the client checks if the server has tampered with the outsourced dataset. After that, the client verifies the soundness and completeness by computing the distance between every pair of tuples.
Robustness of AR-Based Approach
We simulate the incomplete result by removing 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 percent outliers randomly (i.e., a ¼ 95, 90, 85, 80, and 75 percent), and generate the incorrect result as inserting 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 percent non-outliers into the result (i.e., b ¼ 95, 90, 85, 80, and 75 percent). Then, we measure the probability of catching these incomplete and unsound results of our approach as the following: we repeat 500 trials on the Letter dataset and 100 trials on the KDDCUP dataset. In each trial, we construct a certain number of AOs and ANOs and compare the result against them.
For completeness verification, we check if all the AOs are included in the server's result. If at least one AO is missing, we take the trial as a successful detection. Similarly, for soundness verification, we check if the result contains any ANO, and take the trial as a detection if it does. After we finish all trials, we calculate the detection probability as the pr d ¼ n det n tr , where n det is the number of successful trials and n tr is the total number of trials.
First, we measured the detection probability of incomplete answer. Fig. 4a shows the result on the Letter dataset. We observe that the detection probability is always higher than the required a value (i.e., the probability threshold). We have the same observation on the KDDCUP dataset ( Fig. 4b) . We also measured the detection probability of soundness violations and show the results in Figs. 4c & 4d for Letter dataset and KDDCUP dataset respectively. It can be seen that the detection probability of unsound result is always higher than the required b value, i.e., the soundness catching probability threshold. This proves the robustness of our AR-based approach for both completeness and soundness verification.
Cost Analysis at Client Side
First, we measured the time performance of the AR-based approach on the Letter dataset. Fig. 5a shows the AO construction time. We observe that the AO construction is extremely fast, as it only takes 0.012 seconds even when a ¼ 0:95 and a ¼ 0:95. Furthermore, when a and a values increase, AO construction time increases too, but only slightly. Fig. 5b shows the ANO construction time on Letter dataset. It takes more time than AO construction since it needs to find the t seed . Nevertheless, it is still very efficient; it only needs 0.022 second at most even when b ¼ 0:95 and b ¼ 0:95. Compared with the ADS-based deterministic authentication approach (around 0.18 second to construct the authenticated data structure for both completeness and soundness verification on the Letter dataset), the construction time of AOs and ANOs is negligible. We also measured the verification time at the client side. Fig. 5c shows the time of completeness verification on Letter dataset. We observed that the time grows when a and a increase. This is straightforward as higher a and a require larger number of AOs. In comparison with the ADS-based deterministic approach, the AR-based authentication approach dramatically saves the verification cost at the client side. For example, the ADSbased deterministic approach demands 131 seconds to check the result completeness. Whereas, the AR-based approach only needs at most 0.008 second. Fig. 5d shows the time of soundness verification. Contrary to the completeness verification, the soundness verification time decreases with the growth of b and b. This is because with a larger b value, there are fewer original non-outliers inserted as unsound answer (for simulation). Even though a larger b value demands more ANOs, the number of inserted original non-outliers decreases faster than that of ANOs. This leads to the decreasing number of outliers (including real nonoutliers and ANOs) that the client receives, and consequently less verification time. Compared with the ADSbased deterministic approach, the ANO-based soundness verification is at least 10 times more efficient.
Second, we measured the time performance on KDDCUP dataset and compared it with the baseline approach. We note that the ADS-based deterministic approach cannot finish the completeness verification within 100 hours. Thus we note "N/A" in the corresponding cell of Table 3 . We found that both the AO & ANO construction and verification time are more than that of the Letter dataset, as the size of the KDDCUP dataset is four times larger than that of the Letter dataset. However, the AO=ANO construction is still fast; AO construction only takes 0.165 second at most, while ANO construction only takes 0.035 seconds at most. The ADSbased deterministic approach takes 15.341 seconds to build the authenticated data structure, which is 100 times slower than the AR-based approach. The AR-based approach is also significantly more efficient than the ADS-based deterministic approach. In particular, the completeness verification takes at most 0.042 second, while the correctness verification finishes within 0.5 second. However, the ADS-based deterministic approach needs more than 10 hours to check the correctness, and cannot finish the completeness verification within 100 hours. This proves that our AR-based approach is in particular suitable for the verification under resourceconstrained environment (e.g., on smart phones). With little sacrifice on the correctness guarantee, the client saves significantly for verification. Third, we measured the performance of outlier recovery at the client side. In particular, we count the number of records whose outlierness needs to be examined against the dataset D by the client, and report the result in Tables 4 a & 4 b. Both tables show that the number of records whose outlierness needs to be examined is very small compared with the size of the dataset. For example, at most 8 records in Letter dataset (0.04 percent of the dataset) and at most 167 records in KDDCUP dataset (0.16 percent of dataset) are examined. Another interesting observation is that even though it is possible that the records that need to be examined include both true and false positive outliers, in our experiments, all of them are false positive outliers (original non-outliers). We also measured the time of outlier recovery at the client side. Fig. 6 shows the detailed result. Specifically, it is very efficient to eliminate the false positive outliers, due to the small number of records that need to be examined. For example, it needs no more than 0.1 second on the Letter dataset.
Overhead at Server Side
We measured the mining overhead at the server side as jT D þ À T D j=T D , where T D and T D þ are the time of mining outliers from the original database D and the dataset Figs. 7a and 7b show the mining overhead of the Letter dataset and KDDCUP dataset respectively. We observed that the insertion of artificial records (ARs) does not introduce significant mining overhead. For example, the mining overhead is no more than 1.2 percent for the Letter dataset, and at most 0.25 percent for the KDDCUP dataset The overhead on KDDCUP dataset is much smaller because we insert the same number of artificial records for the same a, b, a, b values into a larger dataset. This proves that our approach is more suitable for datasets of large size.
RELATED WORK
Verifiable Computations for General-Purpose Computations. Goldwasser et al. [18] use interactive proofs to verify tractable computation. The proofs enable the client to verify the result's correctness in nearly-linear time. Gennaro et al. [17] formally define verifiable computing as a technique that enables a computationally weak client to verify the result correctness of outsourced computation. They propose a non-interactive proof construction approach. The proof enables the client to verify the result with complexity polynomial to the result's size. However, it demands an expensive pre-processing and input preparation phase to generate auxiliary information for verification. Setty et al. [44] build a general-purpose verification approach to support a wide range of computation including floating-point fractions and inequality comparisons. Parno et al. [40] propose to construct a VC scheme with public delegation and public verifiability from any attribute-based encryption scheme. PEPPER was proposed in [45] . It dramatically reduces the verification cost by using an argument system in which the verifier queries the linear probabilistically checkable proofs in an inexpensive way. PEPPER also reduces the prover's overhead so that its total work is not significantly more than the cost of executing the computation. [39] is the first general-purpose verification framework to demonstrate that the verification can be cheaper than the native computation. While it is reasonable in some scenarios that the same computation is executed on many different inputs, this is not ideal for the DMaS paradigm where the client outsources the data mining computations with a single input dataset.
Authenticated Outsourced Computations. Quite a few studies [1] , [23] , [38] , [53] focus on the authentication of specific computations. Zhang et al. [53] define a new type of accumulation values so that the outsourced sum operation can be authenticated with two group elements and in constant time. Papadopoulos et al. [38] combine the accumulation values with the suffix tree to facilitate the authentication of outsourced pattern matching. The proof size is proved to be optimal as it includes at most ten accumulation values. Meanwhile, the proof can be readily constructed as the components have been pre-computed in the setup phase. Li et al. [25] design a novel authenticated indexing structure based on Merkle tree to detect the misbehavior by the cloud broker in the service selection process. Abadi et al. [1] propose a protocol that supports verifiable delegated private set intersection on outsourced datasets. The verification cost is dependent on the result size. In the crowdsourcing setting, Kupcu [23] combines cryptography and game theory to incentivize the rational workers to perform the computation correctly, and guarantee the result quality even in the existence of irrational workers who intensionally submit incorrect result. Authenticated Query Evaluation in Data-Mining-as-a-Service Paradigm. Our problem falls into the category of integrity assurance of the Data-Mining-as-a-Service paradigm. Wong et al. [50] propose auditing techniques for outsourcing frequent itemset mining to an untrusted party. They generate a (small) artificial database such that all itemsets in the database are guaranteed to be frequent and their exact support counts are known. By hosting the artificial database with the original one and checking whether the server has returned all artificial itemsets, the data owner can verify whether the server has returned correct and complete frequent itemsets. However, the artificial itemsets can be easily identified by the server with publicly-available information about the original dataset. In order to fix the issue, Dong et al. [12] provide an approach to construct the artificial itemsets in the original dataset. These artificial itemsets are indistinguishable from the original ones, and guarantee to catch the server's dishonest result with high probability. Dong et al. [11] extend the work by proposing a verification framework based on cryptographic proofs to catch any incorrect mining result with 100 percent certainty. Other work [27] solves the result integrity verification problem for various computations such as Bayesian network learning and clustering. Their techniques on computations which are dramatically different from outlier mining and thus cannot be directly applied to our problem.
Authenticated Query Evaluation in Database-as-a-Service (DaS) Paradigm. The issue of integrity assurance for database management was initially raised in the Database-as-a-Service paradigm [20] . The focus is to assure the integrity of SQL query evaluation over the hosted relational databases. A few techniques have been proposed to provide assurance for SQL query evaluation [14] , [20] , [24] , [46] , [51] . For example, Hacig€ um€ uş et al. [20] propose a solution that uses conventional encryption techniques and additionally assign a bucket id to each attribute value to facilitate efficient evaluation. that partially executing query on the provider side, they can support range searches and joins in addition to exact match queries. The proposed solutions include Merkle hash trees [24] , signatures on a chain of records [34] , challenge tokens [46] , and counterfeit records [51] . The concept of verifiable database (VDB) was first proposed in [7] . It uses the verifiable computation mechanisms to authenticate the query results on outsourced databases. Chen et al. [9] , [10] design a new VDB framework to defend against the forward automatic update attack and support efficient incremental data updates. These work share the same result integrity concerns in the outsourcing paradigm. However, their focus is mainly SQL query evaluation, which is dramatically different from ours.
Data and Pattern Security of Data Mining. The problem of how to protect sensitive data and data mining results for the DMaS paradigm has caught much attention recently. A few work [13] , [15] , [30] , [31] , [47] , [49] have been done under this theme. Wong et al. [49] consider utilizing a one-to-n item mapping together with non-deterministic addition of cipher items to protect the identification of individual items in the scenario that frequent pattern mining task is outsourced. Unfortunately, this work has potential privacy flaws; Molloy et al. [30] show how privacy can be breached in the framework of [49] . Tai et al. [47] consider the same scenario and proposed a database transformation scheme that is based on a notion of k-support anonymity. To achieve k-support anonymity, they introduced a pseudo taxonomy tree; the third party server will discover the generalized frequent itemsets instead. Dong et al. [13] design data encoding schemes that preserve high accuracy in data deduplication computation while provide provable privacy guarantee. Dong et al. [15] consider the privacy leakage where the server leverages functional dependency to initiate the inference attack. They proposed a heuristic algorithm to block the inference channel by encrypting a small amount of insensitive data cells. Although these works focus on other mining tasks, their encryption techniques can be applied to our work to provide further protection on data and mining results.
Integrity Incentive Games. Morgan [32] initiates the study by incentivizing heterogeneous individuals in a game to improve the provision of public good. A fixed-prize raffle game is proposed. The author discovers a unique equilibrium when the benefit function is quasi-quadratic. Loiseau et al. [28] extends the study by adjusting the players' actions. Vaidya et al. [48] propose an incentive compatible protocol in the outsourced collaborative filtering computation. However, [48] does not consider the fact even though the result passes the verification, the client still can not put total belief in the result. Pham et al. [41] design an optimal contract by setting appropriate rewards, penalty and verification rate to guarantee the result correctness. Moghaddam et al. [29] model the interaction between the service provider and the client as a dynamic game. The service provider sends either legitimate or compromised signal to the client. Under various circumstances, the desired payoff values are set in order to motivate the server to play honestly. Different from [29] , the server's decision of whether to cheat on the mining result is static in our model.
CONCLUSION
In the outsourcing paradigm, it is extremely important for the client to check if the result returned by the untrusted service provider is correct. In this paper, we concentrate on the authentication of outsourced outlier mining. We consider three types of untrusted servers with different adversarial knowledge We proposed a lightweight authentication framework by constructing a set of artificial records (ARs) to catch any unsound or incomplete result with high probability guarantee. In order to incentivize the server to discover the outliers faithfully, we design a strategic game where the server always chooses to behave honestly to get the best payoff. We demonstrated the efficiency and effectiveness of our approach via an extensive set of experiments.
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